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The Christian Democratic Union/Christian
Social Union in Opposition:
From Elitism to Pluralism
D. DOWELL
Washington State University

]ACK

One of the most significant political developments in the West
German Federal Republic has been the emergence of a near-majority
party, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/
CSU). After World War II Catholic trade union leaders joined moderate
and conservative political leaders in creating what was for Germany a
new kind of political organization, a synergetic "people's party." To an
unpreced ented degree the new party surmounted the economic, social
and denominational sectarianism which had produced the ineffective
multiparty systems of Bismarck's Reich and the Weimar Republic . After
the first national election in 1949, CDU /CSU-dominated cabinets led
the Federal Republic to economic prosperity and a prestigious position
within the Atlantic community. As a result, the party enjoyed spectacular
gains at the polls as fam1ers and the m-ban middle class gradually
abandoned the smaller parties farther to the right on the political
spectrum.
However, in recent years the party's voter appeal his suffered as it
has groped for solutions to West Germany's new domestic and international problems. After having to accept West Germany's second major
party, the Social Democrats, as partners in a Grand Coalition ( 19661969), the Christian Democrats were finally forced from national office
as a result of the General Election of 1969. For the :first time in the
Republic's twenty year history, th e Social Democrats formed a Government, although they needed a coalition with the one remaining minor
party, the Free Democrats, to secure a parliamentary majority . And of
course that Government, now led by Chanc ellor Helmut Schmidt, remains in power today, after being returned to office in 1972 and 1976.
The CDU /CSU's problems am complicated by its unusual formal
structure. It is in fact two parties, except in the Bundestag, the lower
house of the national legislature. The Christian Democratic Union, the
focal point of this paper, is almost a nation-wide party, with the customary national organs plus regional and local units in every state but
Bavaria. There, however, it is the CSU which is the dominant party,
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maintaining its. own organization, with its own party congress and
chairman. Only in the Bundestag do deputies of both parties form a
united caucus, with a single chairman and executive committee. And
even there the CSU deputies function as a disciplined bloc, in effect
as a "caucus" within a caucus.
Like all political parties which have lost national elections, the
CDU /CSU has engaged in self-examination, even self flagellation, during the five and one-half years it has been in opposition. Numerous
individuals and groups within the organization have agonized over its
leadership problems, its diminished appeal to the electorate, and the
power relationships among its various organs-the separate party congresses and chairmen, and the joint parliamentary caucus with its chairman.
As we analyze the structure of power within the CDU we can utilize
the familiar concepts of elitism and pluralism. As we know, elitists
hold that decision-making will inevitably be concentrated in the hands
of a leader or small group of leaders, while pluralists argue that decisions are the product of compromises and bargains struck by numerous
and competing groups.
Currently, both schools of thought have energetic and articulate
supporters among Christian Democrats. The argument is familiar, focusing as it does upon the distribution of power between the extra-pariamentary organization and those of its leaders who hold public office.
On the one hand, some defend an avowedly elitist position: the party
should remain a loosely organized, decentralized electoral machine,
without a direct role in decision-making. The extra-parliamentary organization should support unhesitatingly its leaders in the legislative and
executive branches, and permit them wide flexibility on policy issues.
On the other band, there are those in the party, popularly termed
the "reformers," who argue that if the party is to survive these bitter
years in opposition, it must build a more tightly knit organizational
structure at all levels. Salaried employees should replace regional and
local party notables. Active party units should be organized in the
smallest and most remote communities of the Federal Republic. The
central organs of the extra-parliamentary party should be strengthened
and given sufficient authority to hold the party together in these times
of adversity . And, most important, when the CDU /CSU regains national
office, the party organization should play an active role in policy-making,
even vis-a-vis its own chancellor and parliamentary caucus. 1
1 For an extended discussion of the "reformist" position, still applicable to the
party's problems, see Anton Bohm, "Doch Keine Testwahl," Die Politische Meinung
9 Jahrgang (Mai, 1964), 6-9.
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From 1949 until 1963, while Konrad Adenauer was both leader of
the party and Chancellor of the Federal Republic , most commentator s
agreed that the party 's internal distribution of power was decidely
elitist. 2 His authority was sufficient to maintain him at the pinnacle of
the Government and to hold together the rival factions and leaders
within his own party. Both the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary
organs of th e p arty were united in their desire to remain in public
office and in th eir knowledge that Adenauer's electoral app eal guarantee d
that felicitous status quo. The Chancellor could rely upon the CDU /
CSU parliamentary deputies for complete support , especially on questions of foreign policy and defense. And, because attention was focuse d
upon the dramatic quarrels between the Government and its oppositio n
over such issues as NATO, rearmament and reunification, the publi c
tended to denigrate both th e parliamentary caucus and th e party organization as spineless organs, dominated by the Chancellor and playing
almost no significant role in the decision-making process.
Of course, even during the period of Adenauer's greatest ascendency
over the party, the influence of the parliamentary caucus , particular ly
on domestic issues, was more extensive than was generally recognize d.
Neither the extra-parliam entary organization nor the legislative caucus
followed his wishes blindly , without doubts, without opposition. Here
the Chancellor had to tread a cautious path among the competing
groups and inter ests repres ented in both party and caucus. CDU /CSU
parliamentarians , speaking for such disparate groups as industrial workers, farmers , middle classes, and industrialists, sometimes refused to
support cabinet bills; if they could not compel the cabinet to withdra w
an objectionable proposal , they were more often successful in securing
important amendments desired by the interest groups they represente d. 3
However , the interest groups supporting the party, and their spokesmen within the caucus, agreed that the overriding importance of staying
in power required coherent leadership, effective policies, even some
sacrifices. And they usually recognized Adenauer's right to detennine
the final shape of public policy. To the extent, then , that the CDU /CS U
caucus and parties accepted Adenauer's role as ultimate decision maker,
we may fairly describe the distribution of power during those years as
approaching the elitist model.
But the CDU has had leadership problems since Adenauer gave up
both his governmental and party offices. Neither Ludwig Erhard nor
2 For example, see Ri.idiger Altmann, Das Erbe Adenauers ( Stuttgart: Seewald
Verlag, 1960), pp. 25-60.
3 The preceding analysis owes much to the detailed work of Ji.irgen Domes,
Mehrheitsfraktion und Bundesregierung (Koln, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964), passim.
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Kurt Georg Kiesinger, who followed Adenauer as party chairmen and
Heads of Government, were strong leaders. Neither could successfully
overcome the party's internal conflicts or enunciate persuasive new
policies. And the squabbling among rival leaders and groups, and the
controversies over the distribution of power within the organization,
have redoubled since the party entered into opposition in 1969.
Kiesinger, who led the Grand Coalition, always understood his position to be Chancellor of the Federal Republic and , by virtue of that
fact, Chairman of the CDU as well. Like Adenauer and Erhard before
him, Kiesinger wanted the party chairmanship primarily to protect
himself. He was concerned lest the power that he had won elsewhere,
that is, in the caucus and in the government, should be open to challenge at party headquarters. 4 When he failed to win a return ticket to
the Chancellorship in the autumn of 1969 he had to all intents and
purposes also lost the leadership of the CDU. True , the party observed
the amenities; the ex-chancellor was permitted to remain as party chairman for decent interval. But he quickly learned that that office alone
does not have the authority or integrative power that it has when combined with the Chancellorship. 5
Most important, Kiesinger was unable to capture the chairmanship of
the joint CDU /CSU parliamentary caucus. Rainer Barzel, who had led
the party's legislative forces during the years of the Grand Coalition,
adjusted rapidly to the role of opposition leader in the Bundestag and
successfully defended his claim to that position. Once firmly enb·enched
as leader of the CDU/CSU's only remaining national body, the joint
caucus, he organized a powerful parliamentary apparatus and insisted
upon strong voting discipline. He distributed important leadership posts
within the caucus widely among his chief rivals, both to gain their
loyalty and to contain th eir ambitions. Important decisions were made
in the caucus by an inner group of parliamentarians called the Council
of Eleven, dominated by Barzel. 0
As Barzel gained strength and Kiesinger lost ground, so too did the
power of the caucus increase compared to that of the extra-parliamentary
party, despite det ermined efforts to expand the latter's role. An organizational expert was hired to plan new personnel policies and operational procedures, a central membership card index was finally begun,
Koiner Stadt-Anzeiger, June 9, 1973.
Werner Kaltefleiter, "Zwischen Konsens und Krise," Verfassung und Verfassungswirklichkeit, Jahrbuch 1973, Tei! I, 38.
6 Geoffrey Pridham, "The CDU/CSU Opposition in West Germany, 1969-1972:
A Party in Search of an Organization," Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. XXVI, No. 2
( Spring, 1973), 209.
4
5
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a recruitment drive temporarily tripled the number of dues paying
members, and a new party headquarters building was constructed in
Bonn. 7 But any fundamental reform might have threatened the delicate
balance of interests within the party and thereby endanger its unity.
In addition, regional party notables were reluctant to grant increased
power to the national headquarters. In fact, the entire extra-parliamentary organization remained disorganized and demoralized by repeated
electoral reverses.
As Kiesinger's political power declined , Barzel's new intra-party rival
emerged in the person of Helmut Kohl, Minister-President in the state
of Rheinland-Pfalz, who, although not a member of the Bundestag,
hoped to assume the party chairmanship as a stepping stone to the
greatest prize of all, the nomination for the chancellorship. He appealed
to the party "reformers" and to the fears of many party members that
Barze! might return to the Adenauer pattern. As a means of overcoming Barzel's power base in the caucus , Kohl, voicing the pluralist position,
argued for a greater role for the extra-parliamentary party , utilizing the
familiar arguments of greater democracy, more participation, overthrowing the old oligarchy , etc. etc. He demanded that the party and
caucus chairmanships be separated, to avoid the concentration of power
in a single individual holding both offices.8 He also demanded that the
party's chancellor candidate be named by the party congress, rather
than by the legislative caucus. It was the task of the extra-parliamentary
organization , he argued , to mold the party's general political goals; the
parliamentary deputi es should be charged with executing the party's
broad programmatic commitment. 9 This, of course , is an argument that
plagues most European parties of the democratic left, but is rather
foreign to the theory and practice of parties of the center and right.
But in 1971, delegates to the CDU's annual congress responded instead to the need for clear, unified leadership , and elected Barzel to
replace Kiesinger as party chairman. (Not incidentally, many of the
delegates to the Congress were also members of the parliamentary
caucus.) With another General Election drawing near, the Congress accepted Barzel's argument that during campaigns all individuals and
offices within a democratic party organization must be subordinated
to the needs of the candidate , who must in tum speak for the party
in the only available national forum, the legislative chambers. Barzel
now led both the CDU and the joint caucus.
Ibid., p. 210.
The pro s and cons of separating the two leadership positions are discussed
at length in Kaltefleiter, pp. 40-45.
9 Der Spiegel, January 22, 1973.
1
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One more step remained, however, before Barzel, as the acknowledged spokesman for both the CDU and the CSU, could challenge the
Government of the then-Chancellor Willy Brandt. It is conceivable that
the party congresses of the CDU and the CSU, meeting separately or
jointly could agree upon a single candidate for the chancellorship. In practice, however, the matter has been settled in the joint caucus, where the
CSU ( which presently means Franz Josef Strauss) can play the role
of kingmaker, demanding substantial concessions in return for its
endorsement of a common candidate. And, true to form, Strauss did
delay final caucus approval of Barzefs nomination for some weeks.
Strauss demanded lengthy negotiations, unprecedented in the history
of the CDU /CSU, during which an ad hoc joint commission would draw
up a program, construct a shadow cabinet, and finally name a chancellor
candidate. Only in November, 1971, after considerable damage to Barzel's public position, did Strauss bow to the inevitable and agree to
accept the CDU leader as the Chancellor designate of the CDU /CSU
... but a candidate clearly at the mercy of Strauss and the conservative
forces in the caucus.
But Bru:zel's difficulties with Strauss were still unresolved. In May
of 1972, only a few months before the General Election, the Chancellor
nominee was compelled to bow to pressure from Strauss and the party's
right wing on the issue of Ostpolitik. He had to abandon his earlier
recommendation that the caucus vote "yes" on a treaty with the German
Democratic Republic, and to agree that the caucus members should
simply abstain from voting. Even the pro-CDU newspapers in the
Federal Republic comment ed editorially that the CDU/CSU's course
appeared to be set in Bavaria, Strauss' stronghold, rather than in the
Federal capitol.
Unfortunately for Barzel's ambitions, he was unable to lead the
CDU /CSU to victory in the 1972 election. And, like Kiesinger before
him, his failure to gain the chancellorship meant loss of his party leadership positions. His rivals, especially Strauss, immediately blamed him
for the defeat at the polls. Apparently there was some justification for
this; public opinion polls taken before the election revealed that even
CDU /CSU supporters rated Brandt over Barzel by a substantial margin.
After the election the CDU's own election analysts estimated that Barzel
cost the party 4% of its potential votes. 10
For a short time it appeared that the conflict over personalities and
policies might even result in the break-up of the joint caucus, although
that was avoided when the moderates in both the CDU and CSU pre10

Ibid.
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vailed. 11 In January, 1973 Kohl formally declared himself a candidate
for the party chairmanship and renewed his argument that the chairmanships of the party and of the caucus should not be held by a single
person. In May, 1973 Barzel chose to resign as caucus chairman when
his fellow deputies in effect declared their lack of confidence in him by
rejecting his recommendation that they vote in favor of German membership in the United Nations. 12 Soon after, he gave up the party chairmanship as well.
This time, Kohl got his wish. It was, in a sense, a repetition of events
after the 1969 defeat. Karl Carstens replaced Barzel as leader of the
caucus and Kohl was elected party chairman by the CDU congress in
1973. The duality of 1969-71, when Barzel led the caucus and Kiesinger
the party, was reconstructed. Immediately the old rivalry reappeared,
and remains unresolved today. Neither Carstens nor Kohl regards himself as an interim incumbent. Both appeared to have serious hopes of
leading the CDU /CSU in the next national campaign.
As in Barzel's case, the role of parliamentary leader offers Carstens
many chances to demonstrate his leadership qualities. Although he has
not been conspicuously successful in exploiting these opportunities, the
majority of the caucus appears determined to support him, since attacks
upon Carstens weaken the caucus in its struggle to retain its autonomy
vis-a-vis the paity headquarters. 13
For Kohl, leadership of the party :finally offers a national role and
platform from which to campaign for the nomination. He has reduced
the authority and influence of Carstens over the staff of experts working for the caucus and party. And he has also insisted that the party
should proceed with its proper task of setting long-term goals. In
practice, this has proved difficult; specific policy commitments are almost certain to threaten one or more of the important interest groups
nominally supporting the party. Similarly, Kohl's demand that the party
participate actively in the legislative work of the caucus has met
vigorous resistance.
And, once again, it is Strauss of the CSU who is playing upon the
divisions within the CDU. He offers assistance first to one CDU leader,
then another, but does not hesitate to denigrate his rivals publicly. His
is a strategy of delay; throughout 1974 he resisted Kohl's efforts to be
named the chancellor candidate of both parties. And the strategy may
Frankfurter Rundschau, December 6, 1972.
The majority of the caucus voted no because the bill implied approval of the
entry of both the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic
into the UN. New York Times, May 10, 1973.
1s Der Spiegel, February 10, 1975.
11
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work: Strauss led the CSU to a huge victory in last fall's Bavarian state
election, thus strengthening his claim for serious consideration as a chancellor candidate. 14 Kohl's failure to win a comparable margin of victory
in his own state election in Rheinland-Pfalz on March 9, 1975, made
it difficult for the CDU to deny Strauss the opportunity to challenge
Schmidt the next year. 15
Strauss projects the image of the strong man who can deal with the
approaching social and economic crisis-unemployment, the energy problem and inflation. He decries the lack of law and order, the power of the
trade unions, and the alleged weakness of the Government in the face
of the persistent "Red Menace." He appeals to the inner-most fears of
the citizens of a prosperous but vulnerable country. The greater portion
of the CSU's gains last fall were among the upwardly mobile but
politically unstable urban middle classes.16
The CDU /CSU confronts a very difficult task as long as it remains a
dual party. But the simple surgical procedure of cutting the CDU /CSU
caucus into its components would produce even worse consequences.
If the joint caucus collapses, the CDU will have to organize in Bavaria
and the CSU in tum will attempt to establish itself as a fourth nationwide party. The more moderate leaders in both camps recognize the
dangers: a reform-minded CDU would be competing with a nationalconservative CSU throughout the Federal Republic. Any hope that the
CDU might have of gaining an absolute majority in a national election
would vanish; for its part, the CSU, realistically, could hope for little
more than to establish itself as a right-wing minority party. Quite
possibly, a split between the CDU and CSU could begin the process of
replacing West Germany's aggregative 2½ parties with a splintered
multi-party system.
Little more than a year away from another General Election, the
CDU /CSU was still without a candidate for Chancellor. More than
five years after leaving national office no acceptable arrangement has
evolved to provide coherent and stable leadership. No lasting resolution
of the basic problem of who speaks for the opposition has been achieved.
Effective power is divided between the caucus on the one hand, and
the two extra-parliamentary parties on the other; and the boundaries
between these bodies are poorly defined. For a major party, or parties
if they decide to go their separate ways, functioning within the institu14 The CSU won an unprecedented 62.1 % of the popular vote in the Bavarian
state election, October 27, 1974. The German Tribune, February 13, 1975.
15 Kohl and the CDU mustered 53% of the vote in Rheinland-Pfalz, which was
less than his supporters had projected. New York Ttmes, March 10, 1975.
16 Der Spiegel, November 4, 1974.
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tional arrangements of a parliam entary system, surely this degree of
fragmentation , of incoherence, of decentralization are demonstrations of
weakness, not strength , of immobility, not firmness. Most definitely, the
present pattern of decision-making is not elitist; pluralistic elites and
groups threaten the percarious unity which the CDU /CSU's role as the
opposition demands.
In fact , the CDU appears to have become almost schizophrenic on
the subject of leadership. On the one hand, it is fearful of falling once
~gain under the control of a powerful personality. In that sense, the
ghost of Adenauer still haunts the party. Apparently the CDU will not
accept dynamic leadership except under desperate circumstances. On
the other hand , effective leadership is almost certainly a key variable in
its pursuit of power. The personalization of politics in moder democracies
demands the strong leader, and this in turn means that the position of
caucus and party chairmen should be combined with that of the chancellor candidate. This does not imply a "personality cult"; it is quite
simply a political necessity. In a parliamentary system it is the leader
of the legislative opposition who must present the image of Chancellorto-be. It is he who presents to the voting public an alternative program
during important debates and confrontations with the Government. It
is he who must create majorities and reconcile conflicts among his fellow
parliamentarians. And, not least important , if this role of the opposition
leader is to be an effective one, the CDU must resolve its ambiguous
attitude toward its own leadership if it is to defend itself from repeated
encroachments by the CSU's Strauss. Paradoxically, the CDU /CSU
must provide strong leadership within a system of democratic institutions and norms; if it cannot , the public will look for such leadership
elsewhere.

